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Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before this distinguished subcommittee and to testify about the continued need for the preclearance provision of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.

The Voting Rights Act's preclearance requirement, contained in Section 5 of the Act, is a fundamental protection against minority vote dilution in covered jurisdictions generally, and in the American South in particular.[1] Section 5 mandates that any changes in the election arrangements in covered jurisdictions, including changes in voting rules and the manner in which electoral competition is structured, must be reviewed by the Attorney General or the District Court in the District of Columbia before they may be implemented. The purpose of this review is to preclude state and local governments in the South's covered jurisdictions from implementing changes in their election arrangements that would have a "retrogressive" impact in the electoral position of minority group protected by the Act -- African Americans, Latinos, Native Americans, Asian Americans, and Native Alaskans. Changes that place minorities in a worse electoral position than they were in prior to the change are to be denied preclearance and therefore may not be implemented [Beer v. United States, 425 U.D. 130 (1976)].

[1] The traditional definition of the South, at least for political purposes, has been the 11 states of the Confederacy. Seven of these states, Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia, are covered completely, in geographical terms, by this provision, while two others, Florida and North Carolina, are covered partially. Only Arkansas and Tennessee, two states considered to be in the rim or peripheral south, are not covered by it.

I

The preclearance provision provides a significant protection against "minority vote dilution." This concept denotes the use of electoral arrangements that systematically impede the ability of minority voters to convert their voting strength into the election of representatives of their choice. Minority vote dilution is considered a second generation form of discrimination in the conduct of elections. The first generation of discriminatory devices constituted impediments to voting itself. As many racially discriminatory disfranchisement practices were eliminated, we confronted and continue to confront this second generation problem of dilution. Minorities were added to the electoral rolls, but the structure of electoral competition interfered with their ability to convert those votes into representation of their choice. The Supreme Court made it clear, in Allen v. State Board of Elections [393 U.S. 544, 566 (1968)], that the Voting Rights Act was aimed at the subtle, not just the obvious, forms of discrimination in the electoral process, and therefore potentially dilutive changes, such as the adoption of at-large elections, annexations, and the revision of electoral districts, must be precleared in order to be implemented.

The concept of minority vote dilution is premised on differences in the representational preferences between or among groups. Obviously, if two groups have the same preferences, the votes cast by the voters of one group cannot dilute those of the other. Preferences between groups must differ in order for the votes cast by members of the larger group to veto the preferences of the smaller. When the representatives of choice of African Americans are different than those of the other voters, voting is considered to be "racially polarized" [Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 53 n. 21 (1986)]. When considering whether a change in an election system will increase the dilutive nature of the system, the degree to which voting is racially polarized is a central consideration. Racially polarized voting therefore is a necessary, but not

always sufficient, condition for retrogression to occur. As long as it remains a feature of elections in covered jurisdictions, however, then it is critical that the preclearance protection remain in place.

II

Racially polarized voting has been a prominent feature of the political landscape in the American South, and it was a central consideration in Congress concluding previously that Section 5 needed to be extended, first in 1970, and then again in 1975 and 1982. Unfortunately, 24 years after the last extension of the provision, racially polarized voting still remains prominent in the South today. While this phenomenon conflicts with the normative values of our country, and therefore is difficult for some to admit, it remains an empirical fact. Two of the leading scholars of southern politics write in their most recent book that race continues to be "the central political cleavage" in the South (see Black and Black, 2002: 4). This cleavage is a pronounced aspect of the competition between the two major political parties in the South today. Indeed, to quote those same authors again, "The racial divide remains the most important partisan cleavage" in the region (at 244; see also Lublin, 2004: 134-171, and McKee and Shaw, 2005: 285, 287, 300). But racially polarized voting is not limited to the partisan context alone. Its presence has been documented in numerous party primaries and nonpartisan elections in recent years as well. Racially polarized voting in the South is not yet a phenomenon of interest to only the historians of southern politics.

The continued presence of racially polarized voting within the covered southern states has been well documented during the latest round of redistricting, following the 2000 Census. I myself have participated in this, along with other social scientists and numerous lay witnesses. Following the 2000 Census I worked as a consultant and/or an expert witness in seven of the nine

southern states impacted by Section 5. These are Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, and Texas. This work entailed consulting with officials of both major parties, and serving as an expert witness for both plaintiffs and defendants in litigation. In both of the cases in which I testified at trial, my evidence about the presence of racially polarized voting has been credited and relied upon by the court to support findings that racially polarized voting was a feature of elections in those jurisdictions [Georgia v. Ashcroft, 195 F. Supp. 2d 25, (D.D.C. 2002) and 204 F. Supp. 2d 4 (D.D.C. 2002) and Sessions v. Perry, 258 F. Supp. 2d 451 (ED TX 200), referencing testimony concerning Latino and non-Latino voting in Balderas v. Texas, (ED TX No. 6:01-CV-158, 2002) (unpublished)].

III

My testimony before this committee will focus on my home state of Louisiana. This is not because Louisiana is unique in the extent to which its elections are infected with racially polarized voting. It is not. I focus on it because of the number of recent elections studied and the number of offices at issue in these elections are both large. The analysis on which I rely was performed by me for a section 5 case, Louisiana House of Representatives v. Ashcroft (D.D.C. CA No.1: 02cv00062), a case that never went to trial but was settled on terms favorable to the minority voters.

Prior to the settlement retrogression issues were raised concerning four state House of Representatives districts, Dists. 11, 21, 72, and 98, adopted by the state following the 2000 census, and the state introduced a focus on a fifth district, Dist. 102. These districts are located in different areas across the state. Dist. 11 is located in northwestern Louisiana under the Arkansas border, Dist. 21 in northeastern Louisiana along the Mississippi River, Dist. 72 in southeastern Louisiana under the Mississippi border, and Dists. 98 and 102 in New Orleans, with

the later containing areas on both the east and west banks of the Mississippi River. I analyzed a total of 90 elections, eight in Dist. 11, 12 in Dist. 21, 14 in Dist. 72, 38 in Dist. 98, and 18 in Dist. 102. These elections were held between 1991 and 2002, inclusive, the time period during which the previous redistricting plan, adopted following the 1990 census, was in place.

These were the 90 elections in which voters in these areas were presented with a choice between or among African American and non-African American candidates. These included the elections for the state House seats themselves and also elections for other offices, called exogenous elections, in which voters in these districts participated. All of these elections were held under Louisiana's unusual election system, in which all candidates compete, regardless of party, in an initial (primary) election. The party identifications of candidates are noted on the ballot, and if no candidate wins a majority of the votes a runoff is held between the top two vote recipients, again regardless of party. Many, if not most, of the elections analyzed were contests involving only Democratic candidates. The analysis of the exogenous elections included elections in which voters in at least 20 precincts in a district voted so that these elections would cover more than a very small portion of the district. In addition, exogenous elections in which either all of the African American candidates or all of the non-African American candidates were minor candidates were excluded. The largest overall vote in the area of the district for any excluded candidate was only 13.2 percent in the area.

Elections involving a biracial choice of candidates are widely recognized as the most probative for the purpose of determining whether, and the extent to which, voting is racially polarized. If the analyses of these types of elections reveal that African American voters have a distinct preference to be represented by people from within their own group, and non-African Americans voters reveal a distinct preference to be represented by others, then any dilution or

retrogression inquiry must be concerned with the relative opportunities that African Americans have to elect fellow African Americans. The determination of these opportunities cannot be informed by an analysis of elections in which the choices are limited to only non-African Americans. This is an essential element of a retrogression analysis, even one that attempts to assess the allegedly beneficial "trade-offs" for African Americans resulting from a reduction of such opportunities, such as those alleged in Georgia v. Ashcroft, [539 U.S. 461 (2003)].

IV

Attached to this testimony are tables that report the results of the analyses of these elections. Table 1 contains the results of the analyses of the previous elections for the state House seats themselves in Dists. 1, 21, 72, and 98, while Table 2 contains the results of the analyses of the exogenous elections in the areas of the districts. Tables 3 and 4 provide the same information for House Dist. 102. The analyses are based on the number of African American and non-African Americans receiving ballots in each precinct for each respective election, and the number of votes received by each candidate in the respective precincts. These data were provided by the state. When more than one African American was a candidate in an election, analyses of the racial divisions in the vote are reported for all of the African American candidates combined as well as for the particular African American candidate that received the greatest support from African American voters.

In the far right column the values of correlation coefficients are reported for each analysis. These coefficients may vary from 1.0 through 0.0 to –1.0. If increases in the African American percentage of those receiving ballots in the precincts relate to increases in the percentage of the vote received by the African American candidate or candidates in a perfectly consistent way across the precincts, then the value of the coefficient will be 1.0. If the relative

presence of African American voters in the precincts does not relate at all to the vote cast for the African American candidate or candidates, then the value of the coefficient will be 0.0. If the relative presence of African American voters is inversely related, again in a perfectly consistent way, to the vote received by these candidates, then the value of the coefficient will be –1.0.

While coefficients with values of .9 or above are virtually unheard of in social science research generally, this has not been the case when the coefficients concern the relationship between the race of voters and the race of the candidates they support. Among the 127 correlation coefficients reported in these tables, 102 have values of .9 or greater. All but one of the 127 coefficients is statistically significant at the conventional .05 cutoff. Clearly, across these elections, the votes received by the African American candidates in the precincts and the race of the voters in those precincts are variables that are strongly related.

Correlation coefficients show how consistently the race of the voters relates to the votes cast for candidates. But they do not provide estimates of how much the voters divide along racial lines in their candidate preferences. Estimates of these divisions are provided in the second and third columns of the tables. Reported in these columns are estimates of the percentage of African American voters that cast ballots for the African American candidate or candidates. Multiple estimation techniques are employed for this purpose. Two were approved by the United Sates Supreme Court in Thornburg v. Gingles [478 U.S. 30, 52-53 (1986)]. These were ecological regression analysis and homogeneous precinct analysis. Both techniques compare the votes cast in precincts to the racial composition of the precinct electorates.

The homogeneous precinct analysis simply compares the votes cast in predominantly African American precincts with those cast in predominately non-African American precincts. These are identified in these analyses as the precincts in which over 90 percent of the people

receiving ballots was African American and those in which less than 10 percent was African American. The votes cast for the respective candidates in the two sets of precincts are simply added and compared. Regression analysis is likewise based on a comparison of the precinct electorates and the votes cast in the precincts, but it employs all of the precincts, not only those at the extremes. This is done through statistically regressing the percentage of the votes received by the African American candidate or candidates in each precinct onto the percentage of those receiving ballots that was African American in each precinct. By examining the regression intercept and coefficient the percentage of African American and non-African American voters that voted for an African American candidate can be estimated. The third technique, know as Ecological Inference, was developed subsequent to the Thornburg case by Gary King. This procedure, which also takes into account all of the precincts, employs the method of bounds and maximum likelihood estimation to provide an additional way to obtain estimates (King 1997). A quick glance at the tables shows that the estimates produced by these three procedures rarely vary in any meaningful way.

V

Any examination of these tables reveals that voting in these dispersed areas of Louisiana is unquestionably characterized as racially polarized. Indeed, the phenomenon is pronounced. In 78 of the 90 elections analyzed, 86.7 percent, all available estimates show that African Americans cast a majority of their votes, usually extraordinary majorities of them, in support of an African American candidate, while a majority, also usually an extraordinary majority, of the non-African Americans voted for a non-African American candidate. This was true for 23 of the 25 elections (92.0 percent) for the state House seats, and 55 of the 65 elections (84.6 percent) for other offices. In only one of the areas did the analysis reveal that all of the available estimates

did not show racial divisions in the candidate preferences in over 80 percent of the elections. The exception was Dist. 98 in New Orleans, in which all available estimates showed such divisions in 79.5 percent of the elections.

There is no evidence in this analysis that racially polarized voting is a thing of the past in Louisiana. In the later years of the time period studied voting remained polarized just as it was in the earlier years. And the racial differences in candidate preferences are pervasive across offices. It doesn't matter whether the office at issue is state Representative, state Senator, Governor, Mayor, District Attorney, or Public Service Commissioner. It could be for a position as Recorder of Mortgages or Register of Conveyances. Or it could be for a variety of judicial offices – such as seats on the state Court of Appeals, state District Court, City Court, or on a specialized courts like Juvenile Court or Traffic Court. Racially polarized voting remains pronounced and pervasive in Louisiana.

VI

As noted above, Louisiana is not unique. Post-2000 redistricting litigation has revealed the presence of racially polarized voting in other states that are entirely or partly covered by the preclearance requirement. In a case involving the redrawing of state legislative and congressional districts in South Carolina, a federal district court found that "Voting in South Carolina continues to be racially polarized to a very high degree, in all regions of the state and in both primary elections and general elections" [Colleton County Council v. McConnell, (DC SC 201 F. Supp. 2d 618, 641, 2002)]. In a case involving congressional districting in Texas, a federal district court found, based on evidence from Democratic primaries and general elections, that "the presence of racially polarized voting throughout the state" between Latinos and non-Latinos [Sessions v. Perry, 258 F. Supp. 2d 451, 493 (ED. TX 2004)]. In a case involving

congressional and state legislative districts in Florida, a federal court found, based on nonpartisan, party primary, and general elections, that "There is a substantial degree of racially polarized voting in south Florida and northeast Florida – the areas of the state involved in plaintiffs' claim of racial vote dilution" [Martinez v. Bush, 234 F. Supp. 2d 1275, 1298-1299 (SD FL 2002)]. These findings applied to divisions between African Americans and non-African Americans and between Latinos and non-Latinos. And in a section 5 case involving state senate districts in Georgia, a federal district court found, based on nonpartisan, party primary, and general elections, "highly racially polarized voting in the proposed districts" [Georgia v. Ashcroft, 195 F. Supp. 2d 25, 88 (DC DC 2002); and see Georgia v. Ashcroft, 204 F. Supp. 2d 4, 10, 12 (DC DC 2002].[2]

VII

Racially polarized voting remains a prominent feature in covered jurisdictions within the South, and no doubt in many other covered jurisdictions as well, and therefore how electoral competition is structured has a major impact on the opportunities of minority voters in these areas to elect representatives of their choice. The presence of this phenomenon makes it critical that the preclearance provision of Section 5 continues to apply to these areas.

The importance of Section 5 cannot be measured only by the number of times preclearance is denied to changes in electoral arrangements. Any measure of its importance must also take into account its profound deterrent effect. In my redistricting work I have witnessed the power of this deterrent effect. I have seen the importance of preclearance to districting cartographers and decision makers. I have seen district lines revised in order to avoid their

[2] While some may think that the Supreme Court reversed this finding in its decision in Georgia v. Ashcroft, no such thing occurred. The finding of racially polarized was undisturbed. The case was not tried again after being remanded to the district court because Georgia enhanced the African American voting age population percentages in the districts at issue and the Attorney General no longer objected to preclearance.

retrogressive consequences and the denial of preclearance. Racially polarized voting is, unfortunately, a fact of political life in the South, and it is an important factor in electoral strategizing. The preclearance provision therefore needs to be maintained, so that this strategizing does not result in new electoral arrangements that set back the hard won gains of the protected minorities in the covered jurisdictions.

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TABLE 1

State House of Representatives Elections

Estimates Divisions in Support for African American Candidates

Reported in the following order:
King's Ecological Inference
Regression Analysis
Homogeneous Precinct Analysis

Candidate(s)	% of African Americans	% of Non- African Americans	Correlation Coefficient
LA House District 11			
1991 Primary			
Three African Americans[1]	90.8	17.8	
	93.4	13.5	.950
	92.5	19.5	
Wilkerson[2]	60.4	7.0	
	62.0	4.3	.943
	66.0	8.6	
1991 Runoff			
Wilkerson	85.7	9.6	
	88.7	4.5	.957
	91.0	12.2	
2000 Primary			
Three African Americans	97.7	59.4	
	101.1	52.1	.914
	98.0	54.5	
Gallot	70.4	29.0	
	73.7	21.7	.630
	69.1	25.2	

[1] If more than one African American and more than one non-African American are competing in a primary election, the specific number of such candidates will be identified.

[2] The particular African American candidate, when there are more than one, who receives the most votes from African American voters.

Candidate(s)	% of African Americans	% of Non- African Americans	Correlation Coefficient
LA House District 21			
1991 Primary			
Two African Americans	94.8	10.9	
	98.2	8.2	.989
	94.7	8.2	
Williams	63.8	4.6	
	63.7	4.8	.970
	60.3	3.7	
1991 Runoff			
Williams	89.6	11.5	
	91.0	10.8	.893
	91.5	14.7	
1995 Primary			
Two African Americans *(vs. two-Non-African Am.*)	81.8	6.5	
	85.7	4.0	.987
	81.6	5.4	
Davis	79.5	5.6	
	83.1	2.9	.988
	79.4	4.6	
1995 Runoff			
Davis	91.0	4.2	
	92.7	2.4	.997
	90.2	5.6	
1999 Primary			
Davis	67.5	3.9	
	68.8	3.2	.927
	70.2	5.7	

Candidate(s)	% of African Americans	% of Non- African Americans	Correlation Coefficient
LA House District 72			
1991 Primary			
Four African Americans (*vs. four non-African Americans)*	64.1 71.5 73.2	11.0 4.8 6.1	.823
Minor	22.5 (pl.) [3] 28.5 (pl.) 39.3 (pl.)	0.1 -4.6 0.6	.536
1995 Primary			
Gremillion (*vs. three non-African Am.*)	47.9 (pl) 61.3 84.9	4.8 -5.4 7.1	.758
1995 Runoff			
Gremillion	62.4 68.0 92.6	23.5 17.8 26.1	.658
1996 Primary			
Four African Americans (*vs. six non-African Am.*)	66.1 71.4 95.3	6.7 1.5 8.8	.834
Gremillion	29.3 (pl) 39.3 (pl) 84.5	0.1 -8.9 1.5	.615
1999 Primary			
Two African Americans	57.8 60.3 81.8	33.9 31.7 38.9	.525
Fabve	52.2 54.6 77.2	19.0 17.2 22.3	.646

[3] (pl) indicates that the particular candidate received a plurality, but not a majority, of the votes cast by African Americans or by non-African Americans.

Candidate(s)	% of African Americans	% of Non- African Americans	Correlation Coefficient

LA House District 98

1991 Primary			
Three African Americans (*vs. two Non- African Am.*)	74.9	19.2	
	76.7	18.3	.959
	73.9	18.9	
Garnett	31.0 (pl)	1.0	
	32.3 (pl)	0.2	.942
	34.3 (pl)	2.1	
1995 Primary			
Rome	53.4	6.7	
	53.6	6.5	.967
	50.6	3.5	
1997 Primary			
Five African Americans *(vs. five Non-African Am.*)	83.8	10.0	
	90.4	4.3	.957
	88.8	4.9	
L. Charbonnet	32.5 (pl)	2.4	
	33.1 (pl)	1.9	.931
	33.4 (pl)	1.7	
1999 Primary			
DeBose-Parent	63.1	15.2	
	64.1	13.5	.935
	60.9	11.4	

Table 2
Exogenous Elections

Estimated Divisions in Support for African American Candidates

Reported in the following order:
King's Ecological Inference
Regression Analysis
Homogeneous Precinct Analysis

Candidate(s)	% of African Americans	% of Non- African Americans	Correlation Coefficient
LA House District 11			
1995 Primary: Governor			
Two African Americans (*vs. 14 Non-African Am.*)	70.0 73.9 75.5	4.1 1.0 4.3	.979
C. Fields	70.5 73.1 75.2	3.3 0.0 4.2	.979
1995 Runoff			
C. Fields	97.3 100.4 98.4	11.0 5.9 11.1	.996
1999 Primary: Governor			
Jefferson (*vs. 10 Non-African Am).*	83.9 85.5 85.2	5.0 2.9 9.5	.981
1999 Primary: Ruston City Judge			
Gallot (*vs. three Non-African Am).*	87.4 96.2 83.4	15.0 1.8 NA	.959
1999 Runoff: Ruston City Judge			
Gallot	99.3 101.9 98.2	20.7 14.4 17.7	.993

Candidate(s)	% of African Americans	% of Non- African Americans	Correlation Coefficient

LA House District 21

State Senate Elections: District 34

1991 Primary

Two African	88.8	8.8	
Americans	90.1	8.8	.972
	87.3	10.6	
Jones	86.0	5.5	
	87.1	5.9	.967
	84.2	7.0	

1995 Primary

Jones	94.7	10.0	
	97.7	6.2	.987
	94.8	10.9	

Other Elections

1995 Primary: Governor

Two African	67.7	2.6	
Americans (*vs. 14*	70.7	0.3	.984
Non-African Am.)	68.1	1.9	
Fields	67.6	1.8	
	70.4	0.9	.983
	67.7	1.8	

1995 Runoff: Governor

Fields	98.7	7.0	
	99.4	5.8	.998
	96.8	9.1	

1996 Primary: 6th District Judge

Kelly	68.6	10.2	
	68.6	10.3	.904
	67.5	14.1	

Candidate(s)	% of African Americans	% of Non- African Americans	Correlation Coefficient
1999 Primary: Governor			
Jefferson *(vs. 10 African Amn)*	80.3	3.6	
	80.2	3.8	.991
	76.3	5.2	
1999 Primary: 6th District Judge			
Kelly	84.3	9.2	
	86.4	6.5	.966
	81.7	10.2	

LA House District 72

State Senate Elections: District 15

1991 Primary			
Four African Americans	83.9	12.0	
	87.8	6.3	.929
	89.1	8.7	
Nelson	57.8	1.5	
	66.3	-9.1	.846
	77.0	3.5	
1999 Primary			
W. Fields	96.3	28.7	
	101.3	24.5	.960
	NA	24.3	
Other Elections			
1995 Primary: Governor			
Two African Americans *(vs. 14 Non-African Am.*)	86.4	9.0	
	90.9	5.0	.971
	88.3	5.9	
C. Fields	87.4	7.6	
	90.7	4.9	.971
	88.1	5.9	

Candidate(s)	% of African Americans	% of Non- African Americans	Correlation Coefficient
1995 Runoff: Governor			
C. Fields	98.9	17.0	
	97.2	18.7	.938
	98.2	29.2	
1996 Primary: 20th Judicial District Attorney			
Shropshire	85.0	18.5	
(vs. three non-	84.7	18.1	.878
African Am.)	NA	13.9	
21st Judicial District Attorney			
Butler (vs. four	74.8	6.2	
Non-African Am.)	75.3	2.8	.915
	NA	10.4	
1998 Primary: 21st Judicial District Attorney			
McCraney (vs. four	70.3	10.4	
Non-African Am.)	73.4	7.5	.926
	56.8	13.9	
1999 Primary: Governor			
Jefferson *(vs. 10*	89.7	9.5	
African Amn)	90.8	9.1	.977
	85.3	11.5	
1999 Primary: Board of Elementary and Secondary Education District 8			
Two African	95.8	72.3	
Americans	97.0	71.8	.868
	96.6	71.1	
Johnson	63.0	37.6 (pl)	
	63.4	38.9 (pl)	.743
	64.2	40.8 (pl)	

Candidate(s)	% of African Americans	% of Non- African Americans	Correlation Coefficient
LA House District 98			
1995 Primary: Governor			
Two African Americans (*vs. 14 Non-African Am.)*	51.1 50.8 48.7	0.9 1.0 1.0	.983
C. Fields	50.9 50.7 48.7	1.0 0.9 1.0	.982
1995 Primary: Civil District Court, I			
Two African Americans (*vs. 2 Non-African Am.*)	92.3 91.8 91.3	19.9 20.5 28.1	.972
Love	70.6 71.0 72.0	4.5 3.9 7.9	.960
1995 Runoff: Governor			
C. Fields	99.1 98.8 98.9	15.7 15.7 16.1	.992
1995 Runoff: Civil District Court			
Love	97.4 98.9 96.3	29.0 28.1 24.6	.987
1996 Primary: District Attorney			
Two African Americans (*vs. 3 Non-African Am.)*	77.3 75.4 72.3	4.6 6.9 4.7	.985
Reed	43.7 (pl) 43.3 (pl) 41.8 (pl)	1.1 1.5 2.6	.952

Candidate(s)	% of African Americans	% of Non- African Americans	Correlation Coefficient
1996 Primary: Constable 1st City Court			
Two African Americans	78.9	30.2	
	78.6	30.8	.954
	74.1	24.0	
Boissiere	70.1	22.2	
	69.0	23.7	.957
	64.6	19.6	
1996 Primary: Civil District Court D			
Two African Americans	94.1	60.6	
	94.1	60.3	.893
	95.9	65.2	
Medley	47.1 (pl)	41.4	
	48.6 (pl)	39.0	.433
	54.9	43.9(pl)	
1996 Primary: Criminal District Court A			
Three African Americans	80.4	13.3	
	81.3	12.2	.987
	84.2	17.0	
Elloie	60.4	3.1	
	62.3	0.6	.975
	66.0	3.3	
1996 Primary: Criminal District Court F			
Two African Americans	60.7	22.1	
	60.4	22.7	.900
	54.3	16.0	
Jenkins	41.5 (pl)	17.1	
	41.4 (pl)	17.4	.814
	36.3	10.8	
1996 Primary: Civil District Court I			
Pryor	45.8	6.8	
	45.3	7.8	.929
	44.2	8.4	

Candidate(s)	% of African Americans	% of Non- African Americans	Correlation Coefficient
1996 Primary: Criminal District L			
Pinkston	49.3	13.9	
	50.6	21.3	.924
	48.6	6.8	
1996 Primary: Juvenile E			
Harris	48.1	8.2	
	46.8	9.8	.925
	41.9	6.5	
1996 Primary: Municipal Court			
Vanison	44.1	9.5	
	45.2	8.0	.931
	43.0	6.2	
1996 Runoff: District Attorney			
Reed	64.3	4.8	
	64.5	4.8	.968
	59.1	5.1	
1997 Primary: Traffic Court			
Morrell	90.7	2.3	
	92.9	1.2	.993
	94.2	4.3	
1998 Primary: Mayor			
Morial	97.6	32.8	
	97.7	32.2	.984
	95.9	35.8	
1998 Primary: Recorder of Mortgages			
D. Charbonnet	74.1	13.0	
	73.5	13.9	.982
	71.4	14.2	

Candidate(s)	% of African Americans	% of Non- African Americans	Correlation Coefficient
1998 Primary: Register of Conveyances			
Bookman (*vs. 2 Non-African Am.)*	63.6	8.9	
	64.1	8.3	.980
	62.0	7.8	
1998 Runoff: Register of Conveyances			
Bookman	76.6	5.1	
	77.2	4.8	.987
	75.0	6.6	
1998 Primary: Pub Service Comm. District 3			
Two African Americans	91.8	23.0	
	92.2	25.5	.978
	91.3	NA	
Dixon	58.2	7.1	
	60.1	5.4	.903
	61.3	NA	
1998 Primary: Criminal District Court H			
Two African Americans	54.0	10.6	
	55.7	9.1	.944
	52.6	6.6	
Reed	35.1	5.7	
	37.0	4.1	.926
	36.0	3.3	
1998 Primary: 1st City Ct. Court C			
Two African Americans	87.3	19.8	
	90.3	16.6	.970
	82.6	9.4	
Spears	80.4	14.1	
	82.4	11.9	.979
	76.4	8.1	
1998 Runoff: Public Service Committee; District 3			
Dixon	90.2	14.9	
	90.0	16.0	.973
	89.0	NA	

Candidate(s)	% of African Americans	% of Non- African Americans	Correlation Coefficient
1998 Runoff: City Court C			
Spears	91.6	13.6	
	93.9	10.8	.990
	89.7	9.1	
1999 Primary: Governor			
Jefferson *(v. 10*	95.6	13.1	
Non-African Am.)	95.2	13.5	.993
	93.1	14.4	
1999 Primary: Fourth Court of Appeals			
Russell	86.5	13.6	
	94.0	-4.4	.966
	88.5	5.4	
1999 Primary: Civil District Court M			
King (*vs. 2*	89.4	14.3	
Non-African Am.)	89.0	15.4	.990
	85.1	15.1	
1999 Primary: Juvenile Court F			
Three African	93.4	18.8	
Americans	103.1	3.0	.974
	89.9	6.5	
Hughes	69.6	9.4	
	77.9	-2.0	.942
	73.6	3.8	
1999 Runoff: Juvenile Court F			
Hughes			
	89.4	19.0	
	109.7	8.1	.958
	88.9	7.2	

Candidate(s)	% of African Americans	% of Non- African Americans	Correlation Coefficient
2000 Primary: Juvenile Court C			
Hughes (*vs. 2 Non-African Am.*)	72.0	7.8	
	71.3	9.3	.957
	65.2	6.7	
2001 Primary: Civil District Court E			
Ware	24.0	14.6	
	23.4	15.5	.432
	23.3	12.9	
2001 Primary: Civil District Court I			
Two African Americans	96.0	24.4	
	97.8	23.5	.946
	93.4	18.1	
Griffin	70.4	19.6	
	69.1	19.6	.852
	69.4	17.4	
2001 Primary: Civil District Court L			
Three African Americans (*vs. 3 Non-African Am.*)	89.7	32.2	
	90.0	31.8	.975
	88.7	29.5	
Reese	35.8 (p1)	28.5	
	36.1 (p1)	28.0	.332
	36.1 (p1)	23.2	
2001 Runoff: Civil District Court L			
Reese	86.5	20.5	
	87.4	19.8	.962
	86.7	19.0	

TABLE 3
State House of Representatives Elections
District 102
Estimates Divisions in Support for African American Candidates

Reported in the following order:
King's Ecological Inference
Regression Analysis
Homogeneous Precinct Analysis

Candidate(s)	% of African Americans	% of Non- African Americans	Correlation Coefficient
1991 Primary			
Four African Americans	95.5	3.6	
	100.1	3.6	.986
	95.3	10.0	
Carter	43.8 (pl)	3.4	
	43.6	6.8	.754
	41.8	7.2	
Casby	39.6	0.4	
	45.5 (pl)	-4.8	.834
	44.8 (pl)	7.2	
1991 Runoff			
Carter	95.6	17.0	
	96.1	18.3	.976
	93.7	24.4	
1994 Primary			
Four African Americans	89.4	10.0	
	89.3	10.0	.996
	85.2	12.1	
Mitchell-Grubb	58.7	9.7	
	57.2	10.8	.949
	52.2	10.4	

Candidate(s)	% of African Americans	% of Non- African Americans	Correlation Coefficient
1994 Runoff			
Mitchell-Grubb	90.3	9.0	
	90.5	8.0	.992
	86.3	10.6	
1995 Primary			
Guidry	75.3	6.2	
	75.0	6.3	.988
	71.4	9.3	
1995 Runoff			
Guidry	82.6	12.6	
	82.8	1.2	.991
	81.1	16.3	
1999 Primary			
Three African Americans	69.0	3.6	
	70.6	1.7	.975
	69.3	8.2	
Gasper	26.9	0.6	
	30.4 (pl)	-3.5	.874
	33.1 (pl)	1.8	
2002 Primary			
Four African Americans	82.0	4.6	
	82.7	3.9	.990
	82.1	9.0	
Ford	33.9 (pl)	4.8	
	33.2 (pl)	5.2	.727
	23.6	5.9	
Gastinell	27.1	0.3	
	31.7	-2.7	.594
	41.5 (pl)	1.3	

Table 4
Exogenous Elections
District 102

Estimated Divisions in Support for African American Candidates

Reported in the following order:
King's Ecological Inference
Regression Analysis
Homogeneous Precinct Analysis

Candidate(s)	% of African Americans	% of Non- African Americans	Correlation Coefficient
1999 Primary: Governor			
Jefferson *(v. 10*	97.5	10.9	
Non-African Am.)	98.0	10.2	.994
	94.2	15.9	
1999 Primary: Fourth Court of Appeals			
Russell	82.3	4.6	
	82.9	4.2	.984
	82.7	9.4	
1999 Primary: Civil District Court M			
King (*vs. 2*	85.4	23.0	
Non-African Am.)	85.0	23.1	.974
	79.1	23.0	
1999 Primary: Juvenile Court F			
Three African	97.5	12.8	
Americans	98.6	11.6	.991
	94.2	16.2	
Pierre	54.0	3.1	
	56.3	0.6	.961
	55.4	6.1	
1999 Runoff: Juvenile Court F			
Hughes			
	94.7	6.4	
	94.7	6.0	.994
	91.5	9.3	

Candidate(s)	% of African Americans	% of Non- African Americans	Correlation Coefficient
2000 Primary: Juvenile Court C			
Hughes (*vs. 2 Non-African Am.*)	73.5 78.7 71.6	13.6 6.6 15.7	.973
2001 Primary: Civil District Court E			
Ware	19.7 19.3 19.0	19.5 19.9 21.2	.045(n.s)
2001 Primary: Civil District Court I			
Two African Americans	94.2 95.1 92.6	19.5 18.5 20.6	.985
Griffin	70.1 70.8 67.8	16.1 15.4 18.2	.968
2001 Primary: Civil District Court L			
Three African Americans (*vs. 3 Non-African Am.*)	95.0 95.5 92.5	36.6 35.7 40.5	.970
Harrison	60.2 60.7 59.4	7.6 6.9 11.3	.926
2001 Runoff: Civil District Court L			
Reese	91.2 91.1 89.5	13.8 13.8 18.5	.981